Numerous argumentation systems have been proposed in the literature. Yet there often appears to be a shortfall between proposed systems and possible applications. In other words, there seems to be a need for further development of proposals for argumentation systems before they can be used widely in decision-support or knowledge management. We believe that this shortfall can be bridged by taking a hybrid approach. Whilst formal foundations are vital, systems that incorporate some of the practical ideas found in some of the informal approaches may make the resulting hybrid systems more useful. In informal approaches, there is often an emphasis on using graphical notation with symbols that relate more closely to the real-world concepts to be modelled. There may also be the incorporation of an argument ontology oriented to the user domain. Furthermore, in informal approaches there can be greater consideration of how users interact with the models, such as allowing users to edit arguments and to weight in uences on graphs representing arguments. In this paper, we discuss some of the features of argumentation, review some key formal argumentation systems, identify some of the strengths and weaknesses of these formal proposals, and nally consider some ways to develop formal proposals to give hybrid argumentation systems. To focus our discussions, we will consider some applications, in particular an application in analysing structured news reports.
Introduction
Argumentation normally involves identifying relevant assumptions and conclusions for a given problem being analysed. Furthermore, this often involves identifying con icts, resulting in the need to look for pros and cons for particular conclusions. This may also involve chains of reasoning, where conclusions are used in the assumptions for deriving further conclusions. In other words, the problem may be decomposed recursively.
Argumentation is an important cognitive activity that draws on complex and uncertain knowledge for decision-making and problems solving. Key types of argumentation are:
Prediction of probable outcomes: This involves looking for positive and negative in uences on the probability of some outcome. It may also involve uncertainty about which factors hold, and uncertainty about the relative signi cance of the in uences. An example application may be in medical prognosis.
Identi cation of possible rami cations: This involves looking for possible outcomes of, for example, events, news or decisions. This is complicated by not just looking for the most likely outcomes. It can also involve looking for less probable but more signi cant outcomes. An example application may be in risk control in asset management. This may be viewed as a form of deduction where deduction is some rational process deriving inferences from a set of assumptions.
Identi cation of possible preconditions: This involves looking for possible preconditions of, for example, events, news or decisions. This is complicated by not just looking for the most likely preconditions as for example in criminal investigation or medical diagnosis. It can also involve looking for less probable but more signi cant preconditions as for example in aviation risk analysis. This may be viewed as a form of abduction where abduction is some rational process deriving some of the assumptions used in deriving an inference.
Classi cation according to some criteria: This involves using some set of criteria to decide on the classi cation of an instance. In this case, the most probable classi cation is chosen (e.g. medical diagnosis), the classi cation that can be given without any reasonable doubt (e.g. decision by jury in criminal law), or the classi cation that can be given on the balance of evidence (e.g. decision by jury in civil law). Further criteria include those delineated by voting theory.
Given the importance of argumentation in professional life, there is much potential in developing tools for supporting the task. Formal approaches to argumentation systems have been developed as a branch of formal knowledge representation and reasoning. In contrast, informal approaches to argumentation have been proposed in various subjects including management, social sciences, and philosophy. We believe that the starting position for developing tools for argumentation should be a formal approach. However, we also believe that there are some important ideas in the informal approaches that could be harnessed to produce hybrid systems more appropriate for applications.
An excellent introduction to the notion of argumentation is by Toulmin Tou58], with developments reviewed by van Eemeren et al vGK87] , and an excellent introduction to the role of logic in argumentation is Fisher Fis88] .
In this paper, we review some of the features of argumentation systems, and then consider the application area of argumentation with structured news reports. The application will help focus our discussions. We review the nature of structured news reports, and consider some of the requirements of tools for argumentation with such news reports. In the subsequent section, we review ve key approaches to formalising argumentation. These are defeasible logics, coalition systems, default logics, coherence (consistency-based) systems, and causal networks. After considering the pros and cons of each of these approaches with respect to the requirements for argumentation with structured news reports, we look at the possibilities for hybrid argumentation systems. We look at some systems that are logic-based but also incorporate graphical notation to facilitate user interaction, and then consider further key topics for developing hybrid argument systems including ontologies and scenario analysis.
Features of argumentation systems
In formal and informal approaches to argumentation, we see a number of features that we can draw out and analyse. The common feature in argument systems is that they incorporate some representation of individual arguments (pros and cons) and techniques for comparing con icting arguments. To expand on this idea, features that appear in some or all argumentation systems include:
Capturing factors with in uences Factors are the pieces of information being taken into consideration. This may include information such as assumptions, facts, de nitions, rules, regulations, theories, statistical statements, and defaults. Any argumentation system needs to support the representation of the factors being taken into consideration, and of the in uence these factors may exert over other factors. We may think of a factor with an in uence being an argument. In a logic-based approach, factors are represented in a logical language. In many of these proposals, a factor is represented by an atomic proposition, or set of formulae, and in uences include undercutting (contradicting an assumption used in another factor), and rebutting (contradicting a conclusion of another factor). In a probabilistic approach, a factor may be a random variable and an in uence may be a causal e ect on another factor.
Representing types of in uence From a formal perspective, types of in uence include logical or probabilistic in uence. In some formal approaches, preference orderings over arguments are used to capture a relative di erence in signi cance. However, in an informal setting a much wider range of types of in uence may be considered such as authoritative (eg. if a senior clinician says patient X has disease Y, this is a strong argument for believing that X has disease Y) or legislative (eg if legislation states that the maximum speed on the road is 120kmph, this is a strong argument for not driving faster than 120kmph). Many other types of in uence may be considered (see for example Wal89, Sil96, Sil97, MP99] ). One way of putting them into a formal perspective is that there is implicit knowledge that is assumed with these other types of in uence. We believe that if this other knowledge is made explicit, either at the object-level or the meta-level, then we can return to a logical or probabilistic setting.
Signi cance of in uences Some in uences may be more in uential than others. However, the nature of in uence seems diverse. Types of orderings of in uences include \more likely", \higher risk", and \greater authority". In uence can also be quanti ed such as by a probability value or possibility value.
Aggregation of in uences If there are a number of arguments for and against a particular conclusion, an aggregation function determines whether the conclusion holds in the framework. Often these aggregation functions can be described as being binary since they just consider the existence of arguments for and against, and so they are not sensitive to the number of arguments for or against. In most logic-based approaches, aggregation is nested within the de nition for the consequence relation. In a probabilistic approach, aggregation can be undertaken using a probability distribution.
Graphical representations Graphical representations are often the basis of informalapproaches.
They are often simpler and more lucid then logic-based or quantitative approaches. Though some logic-based and quantitative approaches also incorporate graphical representations. Using a graphical approach, nodes can represent factors, and arcs can represent in uences. Labels on arcs can be used to give more detailed information about the nature or degree of in uence.
The above discussion is meant to indicate some commonality in argumentation systems, and provide a framework for comparison, though it con ates some important di erences between approaches. Further ways that we can compare proposals for argumentation systems include:
Simplicity vs expressibility Simple notation is easier to understand and to use but may lack ways of representing certain kinds of information adequately. In contrast, more expressive languages may be rich enough to give adequate representation of some kinds of information but may be too di cult to understand or use by non-technical users. Furthermore, more expressive languages may be too computationally expensive to use automated reasoning technology.
Representation vs reasoning When using argumentation techniques in decision-support, often the representation of the arguments is su cient. In other words, users are just interested in a static picture of a set of arguments and their interactions. However, in some applications there is the need to support reasoning. First this gives a formal de nition of allowed inferences and second it opens the opportunity for automated reasoning technology. Between the extreme of having only a representation and the extreme of having only automated reasoning is the possibility of tools for syntax checking and proof or model checking (where the user constructs the proof or model and the system checks the correctness).
Push argumentation vs pull argumentation Push argumentation is based on a knowledge engineer constructing a knowledgebase for a user (or set of users) with the assumption that the user has no direct control over the knowledgebase. The knowledge is captured in a formalisation that the user is unlikely to be familiar with, and the knowledgebase is treated as a blackbox. In this case, the results of argumentation are pushed onto the user by automated reasoning technology. In contrast, pull argumentation is based on the user(s) being largely responsible for the construction of the knowledgebase. Hence the knowledgebase is not a blackbox, and the formalism is familiar to the user. In this case, the results of argumentation are pulled by the user. The user constructs the arguments to draw conclusions, though there is the possibly of technology being used to check correctness.
In general, informal approaches seem to be more closely related to particular types of argumentation used in practice. Of particular relevance are techniques developed as decision-support tools in management. In informal argumentation systems, there are proposals for richer notions of warrant. This helps users more quickly and con dently model some problem, and may help others to understand the results of the analysis. If we want to enhance formal approaches to argumentation so that they are more useful in applications, then it is worthwhile examining more closely the nature of formal approaches and considering how they can be developed with ideas from informal approaches.
Argumentation with structured news reports
Here we brie y review the idea of structured news reports. We will be using them to motivate some of our discussions of various proposals for argumentation systems.
Structured news reports
Structured text is an idea implicit in a number of approaches to handling information such as news reports. An item of structured text is a set of semantic labels together with a word, phrase, sentence, null value, or a nested item of structured text, associated with each semantic label. As a simple example, a report on a corporate acquisition could use semantic labels such as \buyer", \seller", \acquisition", \value", and \date". A structured news report is just a news report represented in structured text. An example is given in Figure 1 .
Some news agencies store news reports as structured text. In addition, new technologies, such as information extraction and XML, will massively increase the amount of structured text available. The advent of structured text raises the need for tools for structured text analysis. Here we are interested in using argumentation systems for reasoning with the information in structured news reports. For this we assume that news reports are represented as structured text (eg in XML or in semi-structured data Abi97, Bun97] or in a template output from an information extraction system CL96, Gri97]) where the text entries are individual words, numbers or very simple phrases. We represent each news report as a conjunction of classical logic literals. For details on the process and viability of this see Hun00a, Hun00d] .
Once we have news in the form of logical literals, we can use the literals in some form of logical reasoning. For example, given Figure 1 , we may wish to examine the argument for and against the bid by France Telecom for Orange being successful. Since it is an agreed bid, then failure is most likely to come from the bid being rejected by the anti-trust authorities. This argument would be even stronger if there is evidence that the two companies have signi cant overlaps in their customer or product bases. Another possibility for the bid being rejected is if the bid price is too low, then the Orange shareholders might vote against it, or if the bid price is too high, then the France Telecom shareholders may rebel. So given this news report, there seems to be a lot of background knowledge available that can be used to draw inferences for pros and cons for this bid eventually being successful.
In an argumentation system, we need to capture factors and their associated in uences. However, it depends on the application as to the need for types of in uence, signi cance, aggregation, graphical representation, push vs pull argumentation, and so on. Features of the application that can a ect the choice include the form and availability of the background knowledge, the technical skills of the user group, whether pull or push argumentation is being used, and the reliance the users put on the inferences.
Requirements for argumentation with news
We now need to clarify our requirements for argumentation with news reports by considering the following types of desirable functionality. We are not suggesting that every argumentation tool should support all this. Rather there is a variety of possible functions that may be supported in a given argumentation tool.
Rami cation analysis People constantly need to absorb new information, and to consider the rami cations of it. For example, on receiving the news that the US Federal Reserve Bank has decreased interest rates by 1%, there are numerous rami cations that could follow. For example, the dollar could go down in value, and the European Central Bank could follow suit. Rami cations of interest depend on the users of the argumentation. This raises interesting questions for knowledge representation and reasoning. In rami cation analysis we need to determine both the likely outcomes from events occurring and the less likely, but very signi cant outcomes, from events occurring. Often this would seem to call for push argumentation with the knowledgebase being developed by a knowledge engineer, and the user looking at the results of reasoning. Nevertheless, the user needs to have some understanding of the rami cations, and so there may be a need for abstraction of the arguments used (see also \Abstraction of knowledge" below). Though, a user may want to construct the arguments and counter-arguments for particular rami cations, and therefore undertake pull argumentation.
Precondition analysis People also need to determine how events have occurred. This involves determining the possible or probable preconditions. Returning to the example of the US Federal Bank, preconditions of interest may include the possibility that the US economy might be sliding into recession, or that the US dollar is climbing too steeply. They also need to consider how events may occur in the future, and again need to determine possible or probable preconditions. In the later case, this would often call for pull argumentation since the user is looking for controlling the occurrence of an event. This is explicit in some informal approaches to argumentation. The knowledgebase is developed by the user. The emphasis is on representation of arguments. Usually the automated reasoning is limited or non-existent. However, automated reasoning may be useful even in pull argumentation. For example, if a user has used abduction to identify an explanation for some items of news, then automated reasoning can be used to check that the abduced information does indeed imply the item of news. For push argumentation in precondition analysis, we also need to consider the automation of nding the assumptions. In other words, we may need automated abduction technology.
Scenario analysis In a set of arguments, there may be a number of factors represented that can directly or indirectly in uence a particular factor that is of interest to the user. So the outcome of this factor is regarded as contingent on the value of the other factors. To analyse this contingency, a scenario is an assignment of values to some of the other factors. Given this assignment, the values can be propagated in order to determine the value of the factor of interest. Scenario analysis involves identifying extreme scenarios, such as best-case and worst-case scenarios, and average-case scenarios to see the e ect on the outcomes. Scenario analysis has not really been explicitly explored in logic-based argumentation, but we believe that it is a functionality that is called for in news analysis and decision making.
Abstraction of knowledge Abstractions can help users understand something of the underlying formal arguments without getting overwhelmed by the complexities of the underlying formalisms, knowledge or reasoning processes. Abstractions may be obtained in a number of ways including: presenting only key arguments or knowledge to the user; using a graphical notation to present the key arguments to the user; and giving a simpli ed version of the knowledge to the user.
Linkage of sources There is a need to be able to link (perhaps in the sense of a hyperlink) news articles to inferences and decision making. This is so as to use news articles as justi cation or warrants for particular in uences. This is in uenced by suggestions of Toulmin ( Tou58]) as illustrated in Figure 2 . As an example, consider a user working for a property investment company who wants to make a decision on whether to invest in a new speculative o ce project in Warsaw. The user may start by looking for relevant articles from online information sources. These may be from information vendors such as Reuters or Dow Jones, or from in-house sources. These reports may describe the state of the economy, the reliability of contractors, the demand for o ce supply, the likelihood of big multinationals moving into Warsaw, and so on. Once the relevant articles and reports have been identi ed, the user constructs a directed graph that indicates the key factors together with the relative in uences. This is a form of pull argumentation, where the net result is a structuring of evidence in the form of news reports. There is also a need to use linkage in push argumentation, so that for example inferences can be explained to users in terms of the arguments and the news reports used.
Synthesis of news reports In Section 3.1, we introduced structured news reports as data structures containing facts. Maybe some facts are incorrect, erroneous, or uncertain. But at the level of logic, they are ground literals. This is how we view structured news reports in the rest of this paper. However, news is often synthesised into longer news reports or reviews (eg an article in The Economist or an editorial in a national newspaper). Longer reports can clarify by providing relationships between news reports and other knowledge. Implicit in any longer news report or review is that it is based on a set of arguments with some logical structure. These arguments are made by parts of the text providing facts and warrants for intermediate inferences and overall conclusions. By analysing the warrants, these arguments can be made explicit in the form of a directed labelled graph (see for example Fis88] ). The emphasis is on discussing a number of news reports (either implicitly or explicitly) together with contextual information and interpretation. The relevance to argumentation with structured news reports includes: a synthesis can be used as an explanation to users for certain knowledge used in argumentation; and a synthesis can be analysed to obtain knowledge for a knowledgebase for argumentation.
Generalisation of news reports Given a number of structured news reports, a useful goal is to identify general patterns. For example, consider a number of news reports about companies listed on the stock market that reveal a signi cant fall in sales. For each of these news reports, there is high a probability that there will be another news report for each of these companies that reveals a signi cant fall in the share price published around the same time as the rst news report on fall in market share. Identifying such patterns, and therefore generalising on news reports, is a potentially important way of generating knowledge for argumentation systems.
To summarise our requirements, there is a need for formal argumentation approaches for argumentation with structured news reports. Furthermore, there are requirements for lucid abstractions of sets of arguments, for the ability to link arguments with supporting information, which may involve a richer more speci c notation, and for support for rami cation analysis, precondition analysis, and scenario analysis. All of these requirements may be required in the context of both push and pull argumentation.
Primarily, we see news reports as input data for knowledgebased systems. In this way, each news report is treated as a set of facts. However, we may also view a news report, or set of news reports as a precursor to knowledge. In this way, we may use news reports to generate knowledge via data mining, or motivate, justify or explain (by abstraction) general statements in the knowledgebase by association (by linkage). In order to further delineate our concerns in this paper, we need to brie y review the monological and the dialectical views on argumentation.
Monological A single agent has the knowledge to construct arguments for and against a particular proposition. The knowledge may come from heterogeneous sources. After constructing the arguments, the agent may then draw some conclusion on the basis of the assembled arguments. The emphasis of the monological view is on how to construct the arguments and how to draw conclusions from the assembled arguments.
Dialectical A set of agents interact to construct arguments for and against a particular proposition. If an agent o ers an argument, one or more of the other agents may dispute the argument. Agents may use strategies to persuade the other agents to draw some conclusion on the basis of the assembled arguments. The emphasis of the dialectical view is on the nature of the interactions, and on the process of building up the set of arguments until the agents collectively draw a conclusion.
We assume the focus of our interest is the monological view since we are trying to model the arguments that follow from news reports from the perspective of a single agent. We may consider the agent as being some kind of editor who is collating informationprior to drawing some conclusion such as identifying some rami cations of interest. For push argumentation, we see the software system as being this editorial agent. For pull argumentation, we see the software system as being a tool used by this editorial agent.
Formal approaches to argumentation
There are many proposals for formalisms for logic-based argumentation. For general reviews of formalisms for argumentation see FKEG93, GK98, VLG98, PV00, CML01]. Furthermore, some of these formalisms are being developed for applications in legal reasoning Pra97], in medical reasoning and risk assessment FD00], and in agent-based systems PSJ98]. A review of argumentation systems that relate proposals to potential application areas in knowledge engineering, decision-support, multi-agent negotiation, and software engineering, is given in CRL00].
In this section, we will consider key proposals for defeasible logics, coalition systems, default logics, coherence (consistency-based) systems, and causal networks in more detail, and in particular consider how they meet the requirements for argumentation with news. Our presentation will be biased towards building argumentation systems rather than the subtleties of the formalisms.
We have taken a broader interpretation of formalisms for argumentation than is often used in the argumentation logics literature. Our reasoning for taking a wider view is that as the role of argumentation is being developed, then there are formalisms developed for other roles, such as in non-monotonic reasoning, that are potentially useful in argumentation. However, we believe that there are further formalisms that could also be included, in particular paraconsistent logics such as C ! dC74], four-valued logic Bel77], and quasi-classical logic Hun00c, Hun01a].
Defeasible logics
There are a number of proposals for defeasible logics. The common feature for these logics is the incorporation of a defeasible implication into the language.
Defeasible logics have their origins in philosophy and were originally developed for reasoning problems similar to those addressed by non-monotonic logics in arti cial intelligence. In Pol87, Pol92], Pollock conceptualises the notions of reasons, prima facie reasons, defeaters, rebutting defeaters, and undercutting defeaters, in terms of formal logic. Arguments can then be de ned as chains of reasons leading to a conclusion with consideration of potential defeaters at each step. Di erent types of argument occur depending on the nature of the reasons and defeaters. This has provided a starting point for a number of proposals for logic-based argumentation.
The defeasible argument system, of SL92], extends a classical knowledgebase with defeasible (meta-level) rules of the form ) , where if is inferable, then is inferable. Each rule may have free variables that can be universally instantiated.
From a knowledgebase of classical (non-defeasible) formulae, plus defeasible (meta-level) rules, argument \for" and \against" any particular inference can be constructed. Each argument is a proof tree, where each step in the proof tree is either an application of modus ponens or an application of universal instantiation. In case of con ict, \more informed" arguments are preferred, as illustrated by the following examples.
Example 4.1 Consider f ^ ) g as an argument for using the non-defeasible set f ; g and f ) : g as an argument for : using the non-defeasible set f g. Here the non-defeasible set f ; g can also be used to derive : from the argument f ) : g, but we cannot use the nondefeasible set f g used with the second argument to derive using the rule in the rst argument. In other words, f ^ ) g with f g is not an argument for . So the rst argument is more informed than the second argument.
Example 4.2 Consider f ) : g as an argument for : using the non-defeasible set f g and f ) ; ) g as an argument for using either of the non-defeasible sets f g or f g. Here the non-defeasible set f g can also be used to derive : from the rule f ) : g in the rst argument, but we cannot use the non-defeasible set f g from the second argument to derive : using the rule in the rst argument. In other words, f ) : g with f g is not an argument for : . So the rst argument is more informed than the second argument.
Another approach that may be described as based on defeasible logics is that of abstract argument systems Vre97]. An abstract argumentation system is a collection of \defeasible proofs", called arguments, together with an ordering relation that represents the relative di erence in force of the arguments. The system does not assume a particular underlying language, and so no consideration is given to connectives including negation. Though the language does include ? as a symbol. Assuming 1 ; :::; n?1 ; n are object-level formulae, then strict rules of inference are of the form 1 ; :::; n?1 ! n and defeasible rules of inference are of the form 1 ; :::; n?1 ) n . So if there are arguments for the premises of a rule holding, then there is an argument for the consequent holding. In this way, rules can be composed into trees to give more complex trees.
The framework focuses on incompatibility of sets of arguments, as opposed to inconsistency of pairs of arguments, and defeat is de ned in terms of incompatibility and the ordering relation over arguments so that in case of incompatibility, less preferred arguments are defeated. This is used via a notion of inductive warrant. We start with a xed base set of arguments that is a nite compatible subset of the language, and then generate all arguments from this. This gives the level 1 arguments. At level 2, some arguments are defeated by arguments not defeated by arguments at level 1. At level 3, some arguments of level 2 that were defeaters at level 2, are defeated by arguments at level 2 and so the arguments they defeated are reinstated. This process continues at level 4,5,... until a xpoint is reached.
In practice, and for comparison with other defeasible logics, we can treat the meta-level symbols ! and ) as object-level symbols. The practical advantage of this is we then have a relatively simple language together with an intuitive strategy for deciding which arguments should ultimately hold. Some users may appreciate a language that does not incorporate the usual connectives and does not force incompatibility to equate with and : holding for some formula .
Defeasible logics such as LDR can also be used to formalise aspects of argumentation Nut88]. The language of LDR is composed of a set of atoms, and the connectives f:; ); !; >;^g. Clauses are formed as follows, where is a conjunct of literals, and is a literal: (1) ! is an absolute rule; (2) ) is a defeasible rule; and (3) > is a defeater rule.
An absolute rule cannot be defeated, and the consequent can be inferred when the antecedent is satis ed. For a defeasible rule, the consequent can be inferred when the antecedent is satis ed, and the rule is not defeated. It is defeated when: (1) the complement of the consequent is inferred from an absolute rule; or (2) the complement of the consequent is inferred from a more speci c defeasible rule; or (3) there is a more speci c defeater rule that has its antecedent satis ed, and has a consequent that is the complement of the defeasible rule. The defeater rules do not give inferences -they can only defeat defeasible inferences.
Example 4.3 Assume we have a knowledgebase containing just ) and ^ > : . If we add the literal , then we infer . However, if we add the literals and , then we do not infer , nor do we infer : .
The speci city ordering is determined from the antecedents of the defeasible and defeater rules: If the antecedent to one rule can be used in conjunction with the remainder of the database (i.e. the database minus the two competing rules) to prove the antecedent of the other rule, but not vice versa, then that rule is more speci c.
In a similar vein, ordered logic is a defeasible logic but with just defeasible rules and an explicit ordering over formulae LV90]. It is based on a partially ordered structure of logical theories termed
objects. An object is a nite set of rules of the form ? ! where ? is a nite set of literals, and is a literal. ? is the antecedent and is the consequent. A knowledgebase is a tuple = (O; ; R; K) where (O; ) is a poset of objects, R is a nite set of rules, and K : O 7 ! }(R) is a function assigning a set of rules to each object. The relation i j means that i is more preferred to j. The rules and facts that are explicitly represented at an object do not constitute the entire knowledge about an object. A speci city relation (i.e. ) de ned on the objects allows for proof rules to infer knowledge at an object on the basis of knowledge higher in the ordering. In particular, the notion of inheritance is supported by allowing knowledge to lter from a higher object to a lower object. Inheritance may be blocked by either being (1) \overruled" by more speci c information that is contradictory at the lower object; or (2) \defeat" which occurs when an object i inherits contradictory information from di erent objects p and q such that there is no preference for one of the objects over the other.
The proof theory for ordered logic is de ned in terms of the conclusions that can be proven to hold or proven to not hold at each object. For this, the notation i: + means can be proven to hold at object i, and i: ? means can be proven to not hold at object i. Ordered logic has been developed into a general framework, with credulous and skeptical versions GLV91], and an intuitive xpoint semantics. Negation-as-failure has been shown to be a special case.
Defeasible logic such as LDR and ordered logic are useful for formalising argumentation. A proof for a conclusion gives the arguments for the conclusion and the defeaters considered give the arguments against the conclusion. Furthermore, these systems incorporate intuitive forms of reasoning with preferences that can be naturally interpreted as preferences over arguments.
Another form of defeasible argumentation in which the acceptability of inferences are considered before they can be used in further derivations is given in Wag91]. A knowledgebase is a set of classical formulae and a set of rules of the form where and are classical formulae formed from^, _, and :. Various kinds of reasoning are then proposed including conservative reasoning where a conclusion is supported if the knowledgebase contains a rule for it and the premise of which is accepted a conclusion is accepted if it is supported and not doubted a conclusion is doubted if its contrary is supported and skeptical reasoning where the following tighter notion of doubt is used a conclusion is doubted if its contrary is liberally supported a conclusion is liberally supported if the knowledgebase contains a rule for it the premise of which is liberally supported
In order to manipulate the classical formulae, proof rules are de ned to allow the derivation of ^ from and , :: from , :( ^ ) from : , and :( ^ ) from : .
To summarise, defeasible logics capture defeasible rules in the object language that can be put together using the proof theory to construct arguments for and against particular conclusions. Furthermore, these logics o er a range of strategies for resolving con icts that arise between the competing arguments. This range of strategies o ers routes for users to select strategies according to the characteristics of the problem domain. For example, for some applications, perhaps in decision-support, a very skeptical view of inferencing is necessary, whereas in other applications, perhaps in scenario analysis, a more credulous view of inferencing is appropriate. The proposals do vary in notational complexity. Some assume just implication connectives for defeasible rules and some assume the classical connectives in addition. Prototype implementations have been developed for some of these formalisms and it is also possible to use data to learn defeasible rules with priorities CHS93].
To evaluate defeasible logics with respect to our requirements for reasoning with structured news reports, we see that on the positive side, there is support for rami cation analysis, precondition analysis (excluding abduction), and scenario analysis (though undeveloped 1 ) in the context of push argumentation. The disadvantage for push argumentation is that some formalisms are limited with respect to capturing preferences over rules. This means that in some situations too many arguments may be generated. Having preferences may allow for some arguments to be eliminated from further consideration (at least explicitly).
Some of the formalisms are also appropriate for pull argumentation. This partly results from the types of inference are in some sense more constrained than in default logics and coherence systems. It seems quite plausible that non-technical users could build knowledgebases of defeasible rules. In some cases, syntactic sugar or graphical notations may be used to make them more amenable to users. We consider this again in Section 5, where we consider a hybrid system, the ArguMed System, developed on top of a defeasible formalism Ver99]. Also of particular potential is ordered logic which is based on some straightforward principles with notation that could be made much more amenable to a non-technical user group with appropriate syntactic sugar. On the negative side, for defeasible logics there is a lack of richer notation or ontology, and in general a lack of support for abstractions of the knowledge (an interesting exception is the ArguMed System), or facilities for linkage to other sources. Possibly, data mining and machine learning can be used to generalise news reports, and thereby generate knowledge for defeasible reasoning.
Coalition systems
Coalition systems 2 are based on sets of arguments that defend each other against counter-arguments by banding together for self-defence. A signi cant proposal that can be described as using coalitions is by Dung Dun95] . This approach assumes a set of arguments, and a binary \attacks" relation between pairs of arguments. A hierarchy of arguments is then de ned in terms of the relative attacks \for" and \against" each argument in each subset of the arguments. In this way, for example, the plausibility of an argument could be defended by another argument in its subset. The credulous semantics of an argumentation framework is given by the following de nition.
De nition 4.4 A preferred extension of a pair (S, attacks) is maximal (wrt set inclusion) admissible set of arguments of (S, attacks).
De nition 4.5 A con ict-free set of arguments S is called a stable extension i S attacks each argument that does not belong to S.
Example 4.6 Continuing Example 4.5, the set fa 1 ; a 3 g is a stable extension.
Every stable extension is a preferred extension but not vice versa.
De nition 4.6 The characteristic function of a pair (S; attacks), denoted F, is de ned as follows: F(S) = fA j A is acceptable wrt Sg.
The skeptical semantics of an argumentation framework is given by the following de nition.
De nition 4.7 The grounded extension of a pair (S, attacks) is the least xed point of F.
Finally, the following gives the arguments of an agent who believes everything he can defend.
De nition 4.8 An admissible set of arguments S is called a complete extension i each argument that is acceptable with respect to S, belongs to S.
A key advantage of Dung's approach is that since it abstracts from the internal form of arguments and from the grounds for attack, they can be instantiated in many di erent ways. For example, Pollock's approach (discussed in Section 4.1) has been shown to be an instance of preferred semantics JV00], and Prakken and Sartor have shows that their system (discussed in Section 4.4) is an instance of grounded semantics PS97].
Dung's framework has also been extended to allow the representation of preferences over arguments. We consider the rst such proposal, by Prakken and Sartor PS97], in Section 4.4. In another proposal, by Amgoud and Cayrol, the de nition of attacks is used together with this preference ordering to de ne an attacks relation, where for arguments a i , a j , we have a i is defended against a j when a j attacks a i i a i is preferred to a j . In this sense, preference orderings capture a notion of defence. This defence relation is then used instead of the original attacks relation in revised versions of De nitions 4.2 to 4.8.
Using abduction, Dung's framework has been developed into an abstract argumentation-theoretic framework for default reasoning BDKT97]. This can be used as a general framework for capturing a variety of approaches including default logic, autoepistemic logic, and logic programming.
Coalition systems are closely related to various developments in logic programming, in particular in stable model semantics. This o ers a route to implemented automated reasoning systems for some coalition systems such as Nie95]. Some coalition systems can also be implemented without recourse to stable model semantics. In DKT98], a proof procedure for the \admissibility" semantics is given which is more liberal than the stable semantics. This is de ned in the form of a logic program.
To evaluate coalition systems with respect to our requirements for reasoning with structured news reports, we see that on the positive side, there is support for rami cation analysis, precondition analysis (including abduction), and scenario analysis (though undeveloped) in the context of push and pull argumentation. Given that Dung's framework abstracts away from the internal form of arguments and from the grounds for attacks, it o ers an interesting abstraction that is amenable to graphical representation. Though it seems that to more fully meet the need for abstraction, the framework needs to be developed to restrict the arguments shown, and to abstract on the underlying knowledge used to construct the arguments. There is also a need to develop richer notation and ontologies for applications. Possibly, data mining and machine learning can be used to generalise news reports, and thereby generate knowledge for coalition systems.
Default logics
Default logic was originally proposed by Reiter Rei80] as a basis of representing and reasoning with default knowledge. It is one of the best known and most widely studied formalisations for default knowledge Bes89, BDK97, Ant97, Sch98]. Furthermore, it o ers a very expressive and lucid language. In default logic, knowledge is represented as a default theory, which consists of a set of rst-order formulae and a set of default rules for representing default information. Default rules are of the following form, where , and are rst-order (classical) formulae, :
The inference rules are those of classical logic plus a special mechanism to deal with default rules: Basically, if is inferred, and : cannot be inferred, then infer . For this, is called the pre-condition, is called the justi cation, and is called the consequent.
The set of formulae that are derivable from a default theory is called an extension. Each extension is a set of classical formulae. There may be more than one extension per default theory.
Default logic extends classical logic. Hence, all classical inferences from the classical information in a default theory are derivable (if there is an extension). The default theory then augments these classical inferences by default inferences derivable using the default rules.
The method for obtaining an extension from a default theory is given in De nition 4.9. This de nition introduces the operator ? that indicates what conclusions are to be associated with a given set E of formulae, where E is some set of classical formulae. In e ect, this de nition determines whether E is an extension of the default theory. Once ?(E) has been identi ed, E is an extension of (D; W) i E = ?(E).
We can view E as the set of formulae for which we are ensuring consistency with the justi cation of each default rule that we are attempting to apply. We can view ?(E) as the set of conclusions of a default theory: It contains W, it is closed under classical consequence, and for each default that is applicable (i.e. the precondition is in ?(E) and the justi cation is satis able with E), then the consequent is in ?(E). We ask for the smallest ?(E) to ensure that each default rule that is applied is grounded. This means that it is not the case that one or more default rules are self-supporting. For example, a single default rule is self-supporting if the pre-condition is satis ed using the consequent. The test E = ?(E) ensures that the set of formulae for which the justi cations are checked for consistency coincides with the set of conclusions of the default theory.
So, if E is an extension, then the rst condition ensures that the set of classical formulae W is also in the extension, the second condition ensures the extension is closed under classical consequence, and the third condition ensures that for each default rule, if the pre-condition is in the extension, and the justi cation is consistent with the extension, then the consequent is in the extension. The generating defaults (the defaults used) for each extension are the basis of the arguments for and against any possible conclusion. In this way, default logic o ers an interesting foundation for argumentation. There are also a number of developments that are potentially useful for reasoning with news reports including the Theorist reasoning system, prioritized default logic, and a form of defeasible reasoning in default logic.
The Theorist reasoning system (TRS) Poo88] is based on Reiter's normal default logic. It has been developed to deal with a range of examples in an intuitive fashion, including manipulation of contradictory multiple extensions. An interesting feature of TRS is the labelling of knowledgebase items to support the inference mechanism.
Labels are associated with formulae according to the following de nition, where and are classical formulae, is a predicate, and has the same free variables as .
fact : default( ) :
Since the argument in a default label is a predicate, then facts can also have this predicate as a sub-formula. This facility is used in TRS to implement a defeating mechanism. A database for TRS is a pair (F; D) where F is a set of facts, and D is a set of defaults. The de nition of a TRS extension is amended accordingly.
Example 4.9 Take the formulae fconstraint : ! : ; default( ) : ! : g. If holds, the defeating mechanism prohibits the default labelled with , but without forcing : to hold.
Useful properties of TRS include adding defaults cannot decrease an extension, adding constraints cannot increase an extension, and there is always an extension if F C is consistent.
In prioritized default logic Bre91], a partial order on the defaults is used. To use this, the notion of a default extension is rede ned as follows: If D 1 ; ::; D n is a collection of sets of normal defaults, where there is a total ordering over these sets, such that D 1 is the most preferred, and W is a set of non-defeasible data, then E is a prioritized default extension of (D 1 ; ::; D n ; W) i there exist sets of formulae E 1 ; ::; E n such that E 1 is an extension of (D 1 ; W) E 2 is an extension of (D 2 ; E 1 ) : E = E n is an extension of (D n ; E n?1 )
In this way the defaults higher in the ordering have preference over the defaults lower in the ordering, when generating extensions. This has been further developed to reason about priorities in the object language Bre94]. As a result it is possible to change the priorities according to the context. This is a very useful feature for certain domains including for legal reasoning.
There have been a number of other proposals to develop default logic by extending the syntax of default rules. In the approach of Prakken and Sartor Pra97], a form of defeasible reasoning is based on default rules with an associated label attached. This label is the name for the rule, and it is also a term in the classical language. This means that rules can be referred to in the formulae and hence in the default rules. Arguments are then constructed by composing sequences of default rules and rst-order formulae using rst-order reasoning. This is building on the notion of default rules as a form of natural deduction rule.
There is a notion of defeat that takes into account the relative priorities of the defaults. The priorities are represented by an ordering over the labels for the defaults. Furthermore, since the labels are terms in the language, the priorities can be reasoned about in the language.
To determine which arguments are regarded as acceptable after taking into account all the possible defeaters, both undercutters and rebutter, the approach incorporates a notion of acceptable arguments that is analogous to that in the coalition systems. In other words, an argument is acceptable with respect to a set of arguments i all the arguments defeating are defeated by an argument in . There is also a version of the Prakken and Sartor framework based on a logic programming language PS97]. This later version can also be considered as a defeasible logic approach.
There are a number of other approaches based on default logic that could be described as o ering argumentative reasoning. The family of default logics is one of the most well-explored formalisms for default knowledge. There is a range of useful variants, and inferencing technology is being developed (for a review see Sch98]). It is also possible to learn default rules from data DN99].
There are numerous other non-monotonic reasoning formalisms that may be useful in argumentation. For a review of non-monotonic logics see Ant97]. We have concentrated on default logic because of its intuitive and practical behaviour with many examples.
To evaluate default logics with respect to our requirements for reasoning with structured news reports, we see that on the positive side, there is support for rami cation analysis, precondition analysis (excluding abduction), and scenario analysis (though undeveloped) in the context of push argumentation. However, as they are currently presented the formalisms are really too complicated for pull argumentation, except perhaps Theorist, unless the users have some familiarity with classical logic and default logic. Graphical notations can be used to make them more amenable to users | we return to this in section 5.2 | which can o er abstractions. On the negative side, currently there is a lack of techniques for abstractions, and a lack of support for linkage. There is also a lack of appropriate ontologies for constructing argumentation systems based on default logic.
Coherence systems
One of the most obvious strategies for handling inconsistency in a database is to reason with consistent subsets of the database. This is closely related to the approach of removing information from the database that is causing an inconsistency. Here, we explore some of the issues relating these approaches in the context of classical proof theory.
In coherence systems, an argument is based on a consistent subset of a inconsistent set of formulae | the inconsistency arises from the con icting views being represented. Further constraints can be imposed on the consistent subset for it to be an allowed argument. This range of further constraints gives us a range of approaches to argumentation.
De nition 4.12 Let be a database and let`be the classical consequence relation. Then: We can consider a maximally consistent subset of a database as capturing a \plausible" or \co-herent" view on the database. For this reason, the set MC( ) is important in many of the de nitions presented in the rest of this section. Furthermore, we consider FREE( ), which is equal to T MC( ), as capturing all the \uncontroversial" information in . In contrast, we consider the set S MI( ) as capturing all the \problematical" data in .
Example 4.10 Let = f ; : ; ! ; : ! ; g. This gives two maximally consistent subsets, 1 = f ; ! ; : ! ; g, and 2 = f: ; ! ; : ! ; g. From this T MC( )=f ! ; : ! ; g, and a minimally inconsistent subset = f ; : g.
A problem with using inferences from consistent subsets of an inconsistent database is that they are only weakly justi ed in general. In other words, if is an inference from a consistent subset, we do not necessarily have strong reason to believe it. To handle this problem, we can adopt the notion of an argument from a database, and a notion of acceptability of an argument. An argument is a subset of the database, together with an inference from that subset. Using the notion of acceptability, the set of all arguments can be partitioned into sets of (arguments of) di erent degrees of acceptability. This can then be used to de ne a class of consequence relations (see for example BDP93, EGH95]).
De nition 4.13 Let be a database. An argument from is a pair, ( ; ), such that and ` . An argument is consistent, if is consistent. We denote the set of arguments from as An( ), where An( ) = f( ; )j ^ ` g. ? is an argument set of i ? An( ).
De nition 4.14 Let be a database. Let ( ; ) and ( ; ) be any arguments constructed from . If` $ : , then ( ; ) is a rebutting defeater of ( ; ). If 2 and` $ : , then ( ; ) is an undercutting defeater of ( ; ).
Rebutting defeat, as de ned here, is a symmetrical relation. One way of changing this is by use of priorities, such as in systems based on explicit representation of preference (eg Bre89, CRS93, BDP95]), or as in systems based on speci city (eg Poo88]).
For a database , an argumentative structure is any set of subsets of An( ). The intention behind the de nition for an argumentative structure is that di erent subsets of An( ) have di erent degrees of acceptability. Below, we present one particular argumentative structure A , and then explain how the de nition captures notions of acceptability.
De nition 4.15 The following sets constitute the argumentative structure A , where is a database.
AT( ) = f(;; )j;` g AF( ) = f( ; )j FREE( )^ ` g AB( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ); 2 ` )g ARU( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ( 8 2 MC( ) 6 : )^(8 2 MC( ); 2 6 : )g AU( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ); 2 6 : )g A8( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ) ` )g AR( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ) 6 : )g A9( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` g The naming conventions for the argument sets are motivated as follows. T is for the tautological arguments -i.e. those that follow from the empty set of premises. F is for the free arguments -(due to Benferhat et al BDP93]) -which are the arguments that follow from the data that is free of inconsistencies. B is for the backed arguments -i.e. those for which all the premises follow from all the maximally consistent subsets of the data. RU is for the arguments that are not subject to either rebutting or undercutting. U is for the arguments that are not subject to undercutting. 8 is for the universal arguments -(essentially due to Manor and Rescher MR70], where it was called inevitable arguments) -which are the arguments that follow from all maximally consistent subsets of the data. R is for the arguments that are not subject to rebutting. 9 is for existential arguments -(essentially due to Manor and Rescher MR70]) -which are the arguments with consistent premises.
The de nitions for A9, AF, AT should be clear. We therefore focus on the remainder. AR allows an argument ( ; ) only if there is no maximally consistent subset that gives : . AU allows an argument ( ; ) only if for all items in , there is no maximally consistent subset that gives : . ARU de nitions, with the only di erence being \ 6 : " in AR versus \ ` " in A8. A similar remark applies to AU and AB. Therefore A8 and AB are strengthenings of AR and AU, respectively (i.e.
\6 : " replaced with \` "). We summarize the relationship between these sets in the diagram in Figure 3 . The main features to notice are that A is a linear structure, and that there is an equivalence of AF, AB, ARU, and AU. The argumentative logics are, in a key sense, restricted: If a pair of formulae are mutually inconsistent, then none of these argumentative logics will derive any consequences from the conjunction of the two formulae (as an example see Example 4.13). Another signi cant drawback is the computational complexity of reasoning with argumentative logics since the reasoning is based on consistency checking (though this is also a problem with many of the other argumentation systems).
Example 4.13 Consider f ^ ; : ^( ! g. There is no consistent subset which gives the inference . In a sense, is locked into the inconsistency.
The concept of an argumentative structure, with the two notions of argument and acceptability, are a convenient framework for developing practical reasoning tools. The set of lex arguments does not necessarily coincide with that of universal arguments, nor is one a subset of the other in general.
An alternative approach to consistency-based reasoning has led to a more general classical logic framework for argumentation. So far in this review paper, the logic-based formalisms considered incorporate formal representation of individual arguments and techniques for comparing con icting arguments. In these frameworks, if there are a number of arguments for and against a particular conclusion, an aggregation function determines whether the conclusion holds in the framework. These aggregation functions can be described as being binary since they just consider the existence of arguments for and against, and so they are not sensitive to the number of arguments for or against. In BH00, BH01], a framework for argumentation with non-binary aggregation functions is presented. In this framework, the language is classical logic, and an argument is a pair where the rst item in the pair is a minimal consistent set of formulae that proves the second item. Non-binary aggregation functions can be de ned that are sensitive to the number arguments for and against a conclusion. To support this, the framework provides criteria for deciding which arguments to take into account.
Another angle on consistency-based reasoning is the introduction of preference orderings over formulae. In Bre89], a knowledgebase is a tuple ( 1 ; :::; n ) where each i is a set of classical formulae. Information in i is preferred to (or more certain than) information in j if i < j. Given a knowledgebase , a preferred subtheory is obtained using the following de nition: = 1 ::: n is a preferred subtheory of i 8k(1 k n) 1 ::: k is a maximal consistent subset of 1 ::: k
So to obtain a preferred subtheory of , we have to start with any maximal consistent subset of 1 , add as many formulae from 2 as consistently can be added and continue the process with 3 ,..., n . Reasoning is then done using classical logic with the preferred subtheory. In BDP95], another approach to reasoning from an inconsistent knowledgebase is proposed, where each knowledgebase is partitioned into a sequence of disjoint subsets 1 ,..., n , and i is more certain than j if i < j holds. From these subsets, the following sets can be formed for i (1 i n) i = 1 ::: i . Assuming be a knowledgebase, we can take FREE( ) as the intersection of all the maximally consistent subsets of . An inference follows from i there is a positive integer such that is a classical inference from FREE( i ). This integer provides a quali cation on the inferences.
In CRS93], preferences over individual formulae in a knowledgebase are used to generate preferences over subsets of the knowledgebase. Given a knowledgebase , and a preference relation < over , where for x; y 2 , x < y i x is less preferable than y. A preference relation over }( ) is obtained from ( ; < ) using either the democratism principle, or the elitism principle, de ned as follows:
Democratism Let and be two non-empty subsets of . is democratically preferred to , denoted < demo i for any 2 n , there is a 2 n such that < and 6 < . Elitism Let and be two non-empty subsets of . is elitistically preferred to , denoted < elite i for all 2 n , and there is a 2 n , < and 6 < .
By analogy with voting theory, democratism prefers that anything removed from a set is replaced by something better, and elitism prefers that anything kept in a set must be better than something removed. Democratism prefers maximal subsets while elitism prefers minimal subsets.
Furthermore, the preferred subtheories of (using the de nition of Bre89]) are democratically preferred subsets of a knowledgebase
Further proposals for resolving con icts based on obtaining preferences for certain kinds of inconsistent subsets have been made for application in diagnostic systems (see for example KW87, Rei87]).
A general taxonomy of principles for solving con icts, such as arising in argumentation, has been proposed PL92]. This proposal assumes that strategies for resolving con ict can be ordered according to boldness, and this order is independent of the mechanisms for producing con ict or preference. This framework suggests that there are further potentially interesting systems of argumentation to be developed. Whilst this framework is potentially important for all forms of argumentation it seems particularly relevant to consistency-based approaches.
To evaluate coherence systems with respect to our requirements for reasoning with structured news reports, we see that on the positive side, there is support for rami cation analysis (excluding abduction), precondition analysis, and scenario analysis (though undeveloped) in the context of push argumentation. However, as they are currently presented the formalisms are really too complicated for pull argumentation, unless the users have some familiarity with classical logic. In some cases, syntactic sugar or graphical notations may be used to make them more amenable to users.
On the positive side, data mining and machine learning can be used to generalise news reports, and thereby generate knowledge for coherence systems. On the negative side, there is a lack of richer notation or ontologies for argumentation, and a lack of support for abstraction or linkage.
Causal networks
Uncertainty and causality are handled in a range of other approaches. In Bayesian networks (for a review see Jen96, Jen01]), a directed acyclic graph is used to represent causal relations between random variables. These causal relations are used to identify independence assumptions between random variables to facilitate more e cient representation and reasoning with conditional probabilities.
Example 4.14 Let smokes, disease, and symptom be random variables and let ! denote a causal in uence. Consider the following Bayesian network,
From this network, we can obtain the following by assuming symptom is independent of smokes conditional on knowing disease is true.
P(smokes^disease^symptom) = P(symptom j disease)P (disease j smokes)P (smokes)
Whilst in a sense, Bayesian networks provide a form of argumentation, the nature of the argumentation is fundamentally di erent from that given by logic-based approaches. In particular, they provide a means for looking at the rami cations of the change in random variables as dictated by the probability distribution and the axioms of probability theory.
For applications where there might not be enough data to form a su ciently accurate probabilistic model, or for applications where some abstraction of a Bayesian network is desirable, an approach based on qualitative probabilistic networks has been proposed Wel88, Wel90] . Reasoning in qualitative probabilistic networks (QPN) is dictated by a qualitative probability distribution and the axioms of probability theory, and so it is also fundamentally di erent from reasoning with logic-based approaches. The QPN approach is based on using the following type of inequality.
P( j ^ ) P( j : ^ )
If this inequality holds, a node in a network corresponding to is positively in uenced by a node corresponding to . This may be denoted (i : ! : +) where i is some label. Similarly, (i : ! : ?) can be used to represent the following type of inequality. P( j ^ ) P( j : ^ ) Facts are represented as (i : : ) where is a formula formed from disjunction, conjunction, and negation connectives, and 2 f+; ?; 0; ?g. Intuitively, if is +, then the probability of is raised, if is ?, then it is lowered, if is 0, then it is unchanged, and if is ?, then it is unknown.
Such qualitative in uences, rather than explicit probability values, can be propagated and aggregated in the network in a way that is consistent with the axioms of probability theory. Whilst the reasoning is weaker than that of normal probabilistic reasoning, it can be useful. Furthermore, it can provide an abstraction of a more complex underlying situation.
Using Table 1 , qualitative probabilities can be propagated. Given a fact (i : : 1 ) and a qualitative in uence (i : : 2 ), then we obtain the fact (i : : 3 ), where 3 = 1 2 reading 1 from the left column of the table and 2 from the top row. An alternative to the operator is the operator given in The qualitative probabilistic reasoner (QPR) is a hybrid approach that integrates logical reasoning o ered by QPNs Par96, Par98, Par01]. QPR provides a formalisation of normative systems for qualitative argumentation. The logical reasoning is a Gentzen-style presentation. As a special case, it o ers a probabilistic semantics for the LA logic of argumentation FKA92].
Some alternative proposals for probabilistic argumentation systems have been based on representing a causal network in propositional logic, and then using a form of Dempster-Shafer theory for probabilistic quali cation of the logical inferences Hae98, HKL00]. This can be viewed as adding a form of probabilistic reasoning to assumption-based reasoning.
Another approach to handling uncertainty and causality is possibilistic networks. In possibilistic networks (for a review see GK98]), a directed acyclic graph is used to represent casual relations between possibilistic variables. Possibilistic networks provide a form of rami cation analysis, though again the nature of the argumentation is fundamentally di erent from that given by logic-based approaches. In particular, they provide a means for looking at the rami cations of the change in possibilistic variables as dictated by the possibility distribution and the axioms of possibility theory.
To evaluate causal networks with respect to our requirements for reasoning with structured news reports, we see that on the positive side, there is support for rami cation analysis, precondition analysis, and scenario analysis in the context of push and pull argumentation. The probability distribution for a causal network allows the probability of rami cations to be determined from preconditions, and for the probability of preconditions to be obtained from rami cations. However, the emphasis is on likelihood (or plausibility for possibilistic systems) of variables rather than on signi cance of variables. So for example, identi cation of highly signi cant, but low probability, rami cations of news reports are not captured by this approach. Furthermore, causal networks o er a graphical representation as an abstraction. In some cases, syntactic sugar may be used to make them more amenable to users.
On the negative side, there is a lack of richer notation in causal networks, and a lack of support for linkage to sources. Furthermore, the type of reasoning is in a sense relatively weak by comparison with the logic-based approaches. In particular, arguments are constructed, but there is no notion of defeat or undercut as in defeasible logics, coalition systems, and coherence systems, and there is no context-sensitive control mechanisms as given in default logics. However, they do capture the likelihood of in uence more directly and intuitively than in the logic based approaches. Other advantages of the probabilistic networks approach include the existence of methods and algorithms for generating them from data Bun96].
Hybrid argumentation systems
In analysing formal and informal approaches to argumentation, it is clear there is a range of options for de ning functionality. Furthermore, it seems that there are some interesting possibilities for developing argumentation systems that incorporate features from both the formal and informal approaches. This leads to argumentation systems that we may describe as hybrid systems. We discuss some examples of hybrid systems in the following sections.
We believe that in general formal argumentation systems are lacking in a number of areas including (1) lucidity in representation and reasoning including abstractions, graphical representations, and syntactic sugar; (2) argument aggregation; (3) argument ontologies and domain ontologies; and (4) scenario analysis. We discuss these topics in more detail below.
Lucid representation and reasoning
In order to make logic-based argumentation amenable to end users, we advocate the use of graphical representations of arguments. An example of an informal proposal using graphical representations is cognitive maps Axe76]. This was proposed as a way to model general situations arising in the social sciences. Another important example is, of course, the approach by Toulmin Tou58].
In graphical representations, we have a number of choices. The nodes in the graph represent factors that are either decisions that can be made by the user or things in the environment that the user can observe. An arc from a node x to a node y denotes an in uence of x on y. In addition, each arc is labelled. The label may be used in various ways including weighting or prioritising arcs relative to the other arcs. Such a graph can be used to model a one-o situation, such as for analysing a strategic decision, or to model a reoccurring situation, such as for analysing a set of operational decisions.
Various logic-based proposals to argumentation can t into this format. Some, already use a graphical representation (eg qualitative probabilistic/possibilistic networks Gef96, Par98]). A variety of other approaches can t indirectly such as some defeasible logics. Di erent approaches impose di erent constraints on an argument graph. Some options for interpreting a factor include: it is either \true" or \false"; it is \true", or \false" or \unknown"; it is assigned a possibility value; and it is assigned a qualitative probability value. Similarly there are various options for the arcs, and for argument aggregation functions.
An interesting example of this approach is the ArguMed System 3 developed as an automated argumentation assistance systems for lawyers Ver99]. The system assists users in making statements, abducing reasons, inferring conclusions, and providing exceptions. There is a graphical representation of attacks of arguments for a propositional logic with syntactic sugar (for example see Figure 4 ). The underlying formalism is a form of defeasible argumentation which allows for arguments and undercutters to arguments to represented in a form analogous to that originally proposed by Toulmin Tou58]. The system supports the process of argument construction by allowing for annotation of various kinds of incompleteness including an exception that is not justi ed and undercutter that is not justi ed. The ArguMed software incorporates algorithms for checking argument structures are complete. It also incorporates various editing functions. Overall the system currently o ers one of the best examples of a hybrid system. Another interesting example is the StAR Demonstrator developed as a prototype computerbased assistant for the prediction of potential carcinogenic risk due to novel chemical compounds KAEF95a] . This system constructs arguments for and against ascribing various carcinogenic risk classi cations on compounds. The system draws on heterogeneous data sources and gives the results using graphical and textual presentations. The argumentation is based on a variant of argumentative logics given in Section 4.4 EGKF93]. In addition, quantitative reasoning in the form of Dempster-Shafer theory is incorporated into the argumentation KAEF95b]. Some of these ideas have fed into the PROforma 4 method and tools which also incorporates a form of argumentation  FD00 ].
An application of the PROforma methods and tools has been in decision support for clinicians selecting drugs for prescription. An argumentation approach is taken which looks at the patient record for evidence of problems with particular drugs and other drugs being taken, and at a drugs directory for information on appropriate drugs for a particular disorder and for information on possible side e ects and contra-indications. Arguments are then constructed for and against each possible drug. All the information is presented to the doctor, and so argumentation is a way of presenting the information, and a way of highlighting information that may inadvertently be Peter has committed a tort.
THAT There is a ground of justification for Peter's act, IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT, IF Peter has violated a property right, THEN Peter has committed a tort.
According to art.6:162.2 of the Dutch civil code, violations of property rights are torts, unless there is a ground justification.
There is a ground of justification for Peter's act.
Peter has violated a property right. In addition, there is the undercutter There is a good of justification for Peter's act obtained by the exception to the warrant.
Another example of a system that has been motivated by the need for pull argument is the Zeno Argumentation Framework GK97]. This system is designed to help users analyse questions, so called \issues", by identifying choices and constraints for solving each issue, and by identifying pros and cons for justifying the choices and constraints considered. The result of using the system is that the user has constructed a tree with the main issue at the root, and then each subsequent node is a choice, a constraint, a subsidiary issue, a pro or a con. The leaves are assumed to be undisputed facts. Each such fact is a pro, a con, or a constraint. An example of a graph produced in this way is given in Figure 5 . Di erent formalised criteria can be used for drawing a conclusion from a Zeno argumentation graph including: Beyond reasonable doubt; Best choice; No better alternative; Preponderance of evidence; and Scintilla of evidence.
Further examples of pull argumentation systems with a lucid representation include the Room 5 system LNA + 97]. This was implemented as a system for pull argumentation with US supreme court precedents. It is partly based on formal argument games and defeasible logics, and it also supports linkage of arguments to sources.
There are various other graphical tools either distributed by academic groups, or companies, such as Belvedere 5 , QuestMap 6 , and Assistum 7 , that incorporate the facility to represent and edit pros and cons for arguments and various annotations such as representing assumptions, causal explanations, predictions, and questions. However, these tools do not appear to incorporate a su ciently sophisticated or formal framework for logic-based inferencing for domains such as handling news reports. @ @ @ @ R P P P P P P P P P P P q ? + Porsche @ @ @ @ R P P P P P P P P P P P q + ? Fast>Safe P P P P P P P P P P P q ) ?
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Fast>Safe P P P P P P P P P P P q ? denotes a con, denotes a choice, and denotes a constraint. In this example, the main issue is which car?. There are two choices Volvo and Porsche and two constraints: Fast is preferred to Safe; and FamilyCar is preferred to Expensive. There are pros and cons for the choices. Of these pros and cons, the only issue is Safe?. The others are accepted as undisputed facts. The only choice for the issue Safe? is Safe and there is a pro and a con, both of which are accepted as undisputed facts. However, there is also a contraint that GovtStats (Government Statistics) are preferred to Advertising. In an analogous way, the constraint Fast is preferred to Safe is also an issue. This constraint can be rejected because the con KidsSafety is preferred to the pro Prestige. This example is adapted from GK97].
From the examples of formal approaches to argumentation, such as PROfroma, the Zeno system, and the ArguMed system considered in this section, the causal networks considered in Section 4.5, and the causal mapping and WeFA graph techniques considered in Section 5.2, graphical representations can greatly increase the lucidity of the representation and reasoning involved in argumentation. It would seem that there are further possibilities for graphical representations drawing further features of the underlying argumentation. Furthermore, from these proposals it seems that many of the logic-based approaches considered in Section 4 can be integrated with graphical abstractions. In a similar vein, it would seem that syntactic sugar, as illustrated by the ArguMed system could be developed for other formal logic-based approaches. However, with both the graphical representations and syntactic sugar, there is the question of ontology that needs further consideration. We look at this in Section 5.3.
Argument aggregation
Most proposals of logic-based argumentation adopt a single de nition for aggregating a number of arguments: For example, holds if is not rebutted and there is an argument for that is not undercut. Some exceptions to this are: (1) Non-binary argument aggregation functions proposed in BH00, BH01]; (2) A form of defeasible logic that incorporates notions of argument accrual, where arguments for a conclusion can reinforce each other, and compound defeat, where groups of arguments can defeat other groups of arguments Ver95]; and (3) Reason-based logic that extends classical logic with principles for manipulating sets of reasons for and against conclusions such as for example \if a set of reasons for a conclusion outweigh a set of reasons against a conclusion, then a superset of the rst set will outweigh the second set" Hag97, VHvdH98].
As another alternative, we may wish to associate the aggregation functions with the knowledge and so use a variety of aggregation functions. In other words, we may want the choice of argument aggregation function to be context dependent. So in a graphical representation, rather than adopt one aggregation function for a graph, we want to allow a user to specify aggregation functions for each node in an aggregation graph. And in a logical representation, the aggregation function is implicit in the object-level rules in the knowledgebase.
To illustrate this, we can consider a formalisation of rami cation analysis. This is based on a notion of causal maps for modelling \causal relationships" between events. Events are either existential event classes, for example presidential-election, with instances being true, false, or unknown, or directional events classes, for example inflation, with instances being increasing, decreasing or unchanging. Each causal map is a directed acyclic graph, where each node represents an event, and each arc represents a causal relationship.
Using causal maps, new information can be propagated to determine possible rami cations. These rami cations are also described in terms of events. Rami cations are represented by arcs between events. So for example in Figure 6 , if we have the news that the number of aircraft sold is true, then we can infer that the unit production cost of aircraft has decreased.
As an example of the need for context dependent argument aggregation consider Figure 6 . We may wish to have an aggregation function for the node unit production cost of aircraft that takes the value of \decrease by 20%" if the number of aircraft sold takes the value \increases by 30%" and cost of aircraft development takes a value \increases by less than 10%". Clearly, we need to extend this de nition to take account of all possible ranges of values that could be updated by the news. But at least, it illustrates how we can specify much more detailed values for the nodes, so moving from just \true" and \false" assignments, and for propagating these values.
Whilst causal maps o er a lucid view on rami cations, there is a need to support automated reasoning, to address problems of incompleteness, to represent further conditions on rami cations, Each node denotes a factor that increases in value (or becomes true), or decreases in value (or becomes false), or remains constant. A scenario is an assignment of \increases", \decreases", or \constant", to each node. An arc is a monotonically increasing in uence and an arc is a monotonically decreasing in uence. So for an arc from X to Y with no further arcs entering Y , if X is assigned \increases", then Y is inferred as \increases". However, for nodes with more than one incoming arc, resolution strategies are required for determining the updated values Hun00b].
and in particular to address the problem of argument aggregation. To do this causal maps are translated into default logic. In this way, a causal map is an abstraction of a default theory.
To illustrate, one of the ways that a part of the causal map can be translated into a default theory, consider the potential con ict arising if both number of aircraft sold and cost of aircraft development are both raised in value. The facts can then be represented by the following.
In the default rule (below), if it is possible to infer inflation-in-development-costs(X) and X < 10% for X, then the con ict is resolved. Obviously further rules are needed for when the justi cation is not satis ed, and further rules are required for the rest of the graph. An outline methodology is presented in Hun00b] for developing these default theories.
Another approach to argument aggregation is found in Weighted Factors Analysis (WeFA), a form of pull argumentation. This is an approach for elicitation, representation, and manipulation of knowledge about a given problem being analysed Hes99]. For example the problem might be to ensure that The project is completed on time and within budget or that The business has increased profitability. Central to this proposal is that a group of experts in the area of the problem can identify factors with positive or negative in uence on the problem outcome. Furthermore, for each of these factors, this breakdown can be repeated by recursion.
The tangible output of WeFA is a WeFA graph. This is a set of nodes denoting factors that can directly or indirectly in uence a factor of interest in the graph. Each directed arc is a direct in uence of one factor on another. A chain of directed arcs indicates an indirect in uence. The in uences may be identi ed as either positive or negative. For example, sales and costs are two factors that in uence the factor of profitability in an organisation, where sales has a positive in uence on profitability and costs has a negative in uence on profitability.
In addition to identifying the polarity for each in uence, it is possible to identify the relative weight of each in uence. For a factor in a graph, there may be a number of factors that in uence it. These factors may have di erent weights. For example, consider the factor passing a new bill in parliament, with the subsidiary factors the bill is supported by a backbench MP and the bill is supported by the Prime Minister. Both these subsidiary factors have a positive in uence, but the latter factor carries much more weight than the former.
Binary WeFA which is a variant of WeFA where the factors in the graph are restricted to being either true or false HH01]. Imposing this restriction on a WeFA graph allows for the approach to be formalised by translating the graph-based reasoning into a form of defeasible logic. This incorporates an adaptation of rule engineering techniques from HM98].
In order to do reasoning with a Binary WeFA graph, a scenario is assumed which is an assignment of true or false to some of the nodes in the graph. If a node is true, then any arc coming out from that node is red. From this assignment, we can propagate truth assignments to the other nodes as follows: For each node x, if the sum of the weights on the positive red incoming arcs is greater than the sum of the weights on the negative red incoming arcs, then node x is true, otherwise it is false. The gives a way of representing and reasoning with the relative signi cance of direct in uences on a node. Figure 7: A Binary WeFA graph with the factor of interest being a1. b1 has a direct positive in uence on a1, and b2 and b3 have direct negative in uences on the aim. c1, c4 and c5 have an indirect positive in uence on a1, and c2, c3 and c4 have an indirect negative in uence on a1. As an example of a scenario, we could have c1, c2 and c3 true. From this, we would get c4 and c5 false by default, and b1, b2, and b3 true by inference, and nally a1 true by inference. .
Both causal mapping and binary WeFA graphs o er a way for users to become involved in the development of aggregation functions. These ideas could be extended to a wider range of graphical notations and underlying formalisms.
Richer ontologies for argumentation
Here, we use the notion of an ontology to mean the set of constructs used to capture some knowledge in a knowledgebase. In other words, we may regard an ontology as delineating the basic components of a language for an application. The importance comes when we want languages that more closely meet users needs. If we have appropriate ontologies then users can represent and reason with information more easily.
Currently in argumentation there is a gap between what the formalisms o er and what users need. For this, there are two types of ontology that need further consideration. These are argument ontologies and domain ontologies. We de ne these below, and then consider examples.
Argument ontologies These can be regarded as meta-level ontologies. Essentially, there is a need for more meaningful constructs for the components of argumentation. Components such as reasons, defeaters, undercutters, etc may be too abstract for many users. So in a given application area di erent types of defeater, warrant, etc, can be recognised and possibly used di erently.
Domain ontologies These can be regarded as object-level ontologies. Essentially, there is a need for domain axioms to be de ned that can be incorporated in knowledgebases of di erent argumentation systems. This would enable argumentation systems to be developed more quickly and for richer domain speci c properties to be identi ed. Therefore it would seem that the motivation for domain ontologies in argumentation are the same as those for using domain ontologies in arti cial intelligence in general.
The ArguMed System Ver99] is a nice example of an argument ontology. Perhaps law lends itself to a richer, more meaningful, argument ontology. The basic components of arguments (undercutters, rebutters, exceptions, etc) are labelled with syntactic sugar to indicate in the role taken in the legal argument. This ontology is e ectively de ned in terms of the underlying defeasible logic. Further examples of argumentation systems for legal reasoning are covered in Hag97, Pra97].
A second example is an ontology for rhetorical arguments Sil96, Sil97] . Rhetorical argumentation incorporates a wider range of in uences than normally seen in logical argumentation. For example, the basis for arguments include reciprocity (return a favour or a hurt), fairness (equal treatment for equal cases), and bene t (do x because x has good bene ts). These types of argument and in uence are then used in addition to logical arguments in an extended version of Toulmin's framework Tou58]. A signi cant advantage of this proposal is that a much wider variety of arguments can be compiled and their relationship delineated clearly in a graphical form. This is appealing for pull argumentation systems and for abstractions of knowledgebases in push argumentation systems.
The problem with this approach is incorporating a formal de nition for reasoning in this system. Representing in uences can be useful, but really we want to undertake inferencing. This requires de nitions for aggregation and propagation of arguments. For example, consider the following arguments which are of di erent rhetorical types. In these rhetorical arguments, it is unclear which should take precedence, or what other information we are allowed to assume to resolve the con ict. Whilst it is useful to ag the di erent rhetorical characteristics of these arguments, we really need to formalise these so that we can formalise aggregation and hence inferencing. Indeed, in some respects the framework of Prakken and Sartor PS97, Pra97] which was discussed in Section 4.3 o ers a route for this. But maybe we need more. Maybe we should seek a rich axiomatization for de ning the relationships that can hold between the constructs proposed in rhetorical argumentation.
A third example is the argument ontology for potential hazards, such as health risks from genetically modi ed food, and the e ects of smoking MP99]. The types of inferences seem much more meaningful than normally used in a logical reasoning system, and are described in terms of the types of evidence used. Examples include: The idea is that for a set of twenty of these inference rules, arguments can be constructed for and against some chemical or biological substance or agent being a hazard. In a sense, each of these rules can be viewed as a meta-level rule in a way that is analogous to default rules in default logic.
Again there is a need for axioms for relating these di erent types of inference or perhaps they could be used for some kind of type-checking for arguments. Having a richer ontology creates problems when it comes to automated reasoning. For example how do you have a general-purpose aggregation function for combining a collection of the inferences that are listed in the hazard ontology? This is not necessarily a barrier to developing the ideas since there is value in just representing arguments and not actually having automated reasoning. But the ontologies do need to be formally-based, and a semantics is desirable.
A fourth example is from the informal logics community, and more generally in philosophy, where there is a substantial literature on the nature of argumentation that looks at questions like \what is a strong argument", and \what is a valid argument". This literature o ers numerous directions relevant to developing argument ontologies, though we will just consider \appeals to authority" (ad verecundiam) here. In this, we equate \authority" with \expert authority", rather than \ad-ministrative authority". The former is authority based on knowledge, whereas the later is authority based on power.
Appealing to authority can be justi able. For example, having a medical operation done is normally justi able when recommended by a clinician, but it is not normally justi able when recommended by say an architect. However, a di culty with appealing to authority is determining when it is justi able. In Wal89], various suggestions are made for when appealing to authority is appropriate, and which we attempt to synthesise into the following criteria.
The expert is suitably quali ed in the eld. Ignoring the expert's advice may not be feasible or wise. The expert o ers su cient con dence in the advice. None of the expert's caveats have been overlooked. The expert's advice seems the best out of any competing sets of expert's advice.
These criteria suggest a meta-level formalisation of reasoning about experts and their advice could be feasible, and that inferences from such a formalisation could a ect the object-level reasoning with arguments. Already some of these features are available in a form of modal logic Cho95].
From these examples, it seems argument ontologies are an interesting and viable development. Perhaps the most important goal in the short term is the development of argument ontologies that are graphically-based and the ontologies are formalised in an underlying logic. This would allow richer and more meaningful abstractions to be obtained.
The development of domain ontologies is a central issue in arti cial intelligence, and much of the research in knowledge representation and reasoning is in some respects closely interlinked with that in ontologies. Whilst much of the focus on ontologies in knowledge representation and reasoning has been on description logics, it is clear that a much wider range of logics are relevant to the aim of building domain ontologies.
As an example of the need to develop domain ontologies in argumentation, consideration needs to be given to arguments over time. Whilst sets of arguments evolve over time, in uences become weaker or stronger, warrants appear and disappear, and so on, argumentation systems tend to be atemporal. Yet within AI and logic there is an extensive literature on temporal reasoning that could be harnessed for temporal argumentation systems to model arguments over time (for a review of temporal logics see GHR94]). Already time is a parameter that has been used in a dialectical framework MP01]. Though the notion of time in this framework is limited to providing a linear sequence over the receipt of items of information that can be used in argumentation. Potentially, harnessing temporal logic o ers much more than this in modelling the argumentation process.
Another issue is that important data and knowledge is temporal in nature, such as always submit your tax form before the end of the next tax year or you will be fined. There is much potential in using a temporal language as the object language. So if we are considering the pros and cons for some formulae , then this formula may be a temporal logic formula, and the assumptions used may also be temporal formulae Hun01c].
Even within the structured news reports, there are temporal issues such as the granularity and format for the temporal information to handle. To illustrate some of our needs, consider a set of news reports in the following situations.
The set of reports refer to the same time point of a subject. As an example, consider a report from a newspaper and a report from a radio station on the weather in London today. So the weather in London is the subject, and the time point is today. However, the TV report and radio reports have not necessarily been made at the same time. So for example, the newspaper report could have been published three days ago, whereas the radio report could have been broadcast today. A set of reports refer to the same time intervals of a subject. As an example, consider a report from a TV station on the weather in London today and a report from a radio station on the weather in London today. So the weather in London is the subject, and the subject time interval is today. As with the example above, the TV report and radio reports have not necessarily been broadcast at the same time.
A set of reports are broadcast at the same time point. As an example, consider a radio broadcast today with a long-range weather report for weather in Europe over the next month, and a TV broadcast today with a weather report for London today. Here, the granularity of the periods of the subjects of the reports is di erent. A set of reports are broadcast during the same time interval. As an example, consider a radio broadcast today with a weather report for weather in Europe over the next month, and a TV broadcast yesterday with a long-range weather report for weather in Europe over the next week. Here, the granularity of the periods of the subjects of the reports is di erent.
To handle these, and a number of related issues, we need to consider how we can enhance our approach to reasoning with the temporal aspects of news reports Hun01b]. These issues obviously impinge on the ontology for time in argumentation, and raise important questions of how richer temporal reasoning can be supported.
Other aspects of developing domain ontologies could draw on options of using ontologies for XML documents (see for example ES01]), using comprehensive semantic networks such as WordNet Mil95], using domain speci c semantic networks (see for example CTHD00]), and using machine readable dictionaries for representing and reasoning with lexical knowledge (for a review see WSG96]).
Developing richer ontologies for formal approaches to argumentation seems like a potentially important step in increasing the uptake of formal approaches in applications. There are a number of papers that touch on the topic of ontologies in the informal argumentation camp and it may be fruitful to nd more suggestions for enhancing formal proposals.
Scenario analysis
In an argumentation system, there may be a number of factors represented that can directly or indirectly in uence the factors of interest. So the outcome of the factors of interest can be regarded as contingent on the value of the other factors in the knowledgebase. To analyse this contingency, there is a need for scenario analysis. Di erent scenarios tell us di erent things about the problem being analysed. Of particular interest are scenarios that could be described as extreme or normal such as:
Best-case scenarios Worst-case scenarios Average-case scenarios Prototypical-case scenarios An average-case scenario is a scenario that is one of the most likely scenarios whereas the extreme case scenarios are not necessarily likely. Given that it would normally take too long to exhaustively consider all scenarios using key scenarios such as these is important. There is also the option of working backwards in argumentation: Starting with a particular outcome for a factor of interest, the aim is to identify which scenario leads to that outcome.
In addition to considering individual scenarios, there is the need to consider sets of scenarios. These can reveal the sensitivity of the knowledgebase or inferencing to changes in the scenario. If the behaviour of the outcome appears very sensitive to the input, then this may indicate that the deciding factors for the desired outcome of factors of interest have not been adequately established. This kind of scenario analysis is called sensitivity analysis. A specialisation of sensitivity analysis is to order the scenarios according to likelihood. If the truth (or falsity) of a node, is relatively stable in inferred truth value, then there is increased con dence that uncertainty has been minimised in the model.
Another kind of scenario analysis is temporal analysis. Here a sequence of scenarios is meant to indicate how inputs to a problem may evolve over time. For example if there is a knowledgebase that models a project management problem, there may be a sequence of scenarios S1, S2, S3, .... where S1 is the scenario for month one, S2, is the scenario for month two, and so on. Here, the aim is to see how the outcome is a ected by the sequence of scenarios.
In a logic-based approach a scenario can be represented by a set of formulae, perhaps just a set of ground literals, which are added to the knowledgebase. However, the suggestions in this section indicate that there are a number of interesting directions in which logic-based scenario analysis could be developed. A key challenge is the identi cation of extreme and normal scenarios.
The informal description of scenario given in this section does not assume a total order over scenarios. It can be a partial order and it does not assume there is a unique best case or unique worst case. If it can be a partial order, then it may support multi-dimensional means of comparing scenarios. Of course, this then means the research may overlap with a number of other areas such as voting theory and utility theory.
Conclusions
We believe that there is a great need for tools for argumentation to support users in dealing with con icting information. In a number of areas, such as the medical and legal domains, there has been some convincing progress. Here we have considered analysing structured news reports as another application area where argumentation tools could be particularly useful.
In order to develop tools, we have considered a variety of proposals, both formal and informal, for argumentation systems. From this, we have noticed that there are desirable features in both the formal and informal camps. In this paper, we have attempted to ag some for these desirable features, and then suggest that we may need hybrid argumentation systems that combine a number of these features within a particular argumentation system.
Returning to the requirements that we considered in Section 3.2, for developing argumentation systems for structured news reports, we can make the following observations. Scenario analysis From the discussion in Section 5.4, this is an underdeveloped area of logicbased argumentation. Yet, it seems an interesting and viable goal to develop logic-based scenario analysis for structured news reports.
Abstraction of knowledge There are graphical techniques that can be harnessed for abstracting from logic-based reasoning, as illustrated by the discussions in Section 5.1. Furthermore, the possible graphical notations available for analysing news reports could be extended as discussed in Section 5.3 using appropriate argument ontologies. There is also a need to develop other techniques that allow presenting only key arguments to the user and techniques that allow a simpli ed version of the knowledge to be presented to the user.
Linkage to sources Connections between graphical abstractions of argumentation and textual explanations are appealing for systems for analysing news reports. In the short term, this seems more of an implementation issue rather than a question of adapting the underlying formalism. In the longer term, it should be possible to interact more directly with the argumentation process. For example, this may include linking two or more knowledgebases that o er di erent perspectives, or abstractions, on the same topic, and being able to run these in parallel to compare and contrast the resulting reasoning.
Synthesis of news Much textual information in the form of reports, papers, editorials, etc, is available that could be described as being a synthesis of news. The development of tools for decomposing such sytheses may prove useful in knowledge engineering, and for abstraction and explanations of knowledge, used in argumentation. A starting point may be rhetorical structure theory MT88].
Generalisation of news There are numerous well-established data mining/machine learning techniques that could be deployed to identify useful patterns in sets of structured news reports. The main question is how viable is it to base argumentation systems on knowledge obtained in this way?
We would like to stress that we believe that there is no one argumentation system that will meet all needs. Rather, there are tools for jobs that should be selected according to the needs of the problem. Furthermore, we believe that it is imperative to adopt formal foundations for any argumentation system. Otherwise, there is ambiguity and unnecessary confusion over the notation, and potential problems in the reasoning, and so rendering it infeasible to engineer a system with su cient knowledge to be useful, and/or leading to a lack of trust in the system by the user.
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